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misspecified. We prove that, in all non trivial cases, finite elasticities of supply to the firm will 
lead to inconsistent estimates of production function parameters. Monte Carlo simulations 
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The last ￿fteen years have seen a dramatic increase in the literature on labor
market imperfections. Work by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) has established
the role of search costs in creating labor market frictions. Manning (2003) shows
how, even in the presence of many competing ￿rms in the labor market, these
frictions imply that a monopsony model may best represent the functioning
of the labor market. Recent empirical tests have supported these works by
uniformly rejecting the hypothesis of perfectly elastic labor supply to the ￿rm1.
Separately, many great contributions to our understanding of labor mar-
kets have come through empirical estimates of production function parameters.
Studies on skill biased technological change and changes in relative wages in-
clude Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (1999;2002), and Card and Lemieux
(2003). Structural work on the impact of immigration on the wages of natives
include Borjas (2003), Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2011). In their
analyses, these studies use the standard assumption of perfectly competitive
labor markets to arrive at their econometric equation derived from pro￿t max-
imizing conditions.
Here, we show the consequences of labor market imperfections on the estima-
tion of production functions. Our main ￿nding is that data from an economy
with labor market imperfections and a given technology will be rationalized
by a di⁄erent technology under the assumption of competitive labor markets.
Speci￿cally, we prove that as long as the elasticities of supply to the ￿rm are
￿nite and not equal to one another, estimates of the production function will
not be consistent. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has addressed
this misspeci￿cation in the context of labor market frictions. The only work
that we are aware of that raises a similar issue is Oaxaca and Lup-Tik (2004),
who note that di⁄erences in wages between two groups that are not attributable
to di⁄erences in productivity may bias a nested CES estimation. They use the
unexplained portion of the wage gap from a Oaxaca decomposition in a control
function approach.
Simulating the estimation of the parameters of a CES production function,
we show that constant and unequal elastiticies of supply lead to biased estimates
of the e¢ ciency parameters. Elasticities that are a function of the wage lead
to biased estimates of the elasticity of substitution between two factors. We
￿nd that under reasonable assumptions the bias can be signi￿cant enough that
a true elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labor of 2 can be
incorrectly estimated as 1.4.
1Studies measuring these parameters include Ransom and Oaxaca (2005, 2010), Ransom
and Simms (2009), Falch (2010), Hotchkiss and Quispe (2009), Hirsch et al (2010) and Depew
and Sorensen (2011).
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2.1 A generic non identi￿cation result





2 are factors of production of respective price wj(Lt
j) for j = 1;2
and the production function F captures technology in use.2 Data from this
economy is superscripted by t representing an observational unit.3 For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the product market is perfectly competitive and
use output price as a numeraire to factor prices. In contrast, the markets for
factors of production may not be perfectly competitive. To formally capture
departures from perfect competition, we de￿ne upward sloping supply functions





@Lj ￿ 0. Note






@ lnLj ￿ 0,




@Lj = 0. In this case, factor market j is said to be





























for j = 1;2 (1)



































as data that consists of the ratio of the two factor prices wt
j(= wj(Lt
j)) for
j = 1;2 and two factor quantities Lt
j for j = 1;2. Equation 2 is the funda-
mental equation of this paper. Using this equation, one can easily prove the
following (non) identi￿cation theorem.





































2We abstract from technological change by assuming that F is constant over observational
units. This assumption is without loss of generality with respect to our key point. Similarily,
we assume that the shape of the supply to the ￿rm of factors of production is constant over
time without loss of generality and for the sake of notational simplicity.































@Lj such that from Equation 2 at factors quantities Lt
1 and Lt
2, this econ-
omy produces relative prices equal to wt
1=wt






Theorem 1 implies that the function of production F(:;:), without any ad-
ditional information about supply elasticities (with the data in hand), is not
identi￿ed non-parametrically. This non identi￿cation result has implications for
the estimation of the shape of the production function as stated in the following
corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 Estimates of @F







are inconsistent when the two factors have di⁄erent elasticities of supply, i.e.
"1(:) 6= "2(:).






. The associated gen-






t=0, i.e. a sample of T observations of this
economy.4 Assuming the type of production is known but the parameters not,
















. The last term only collaspes when "2(L2) =
"1(L1), a special case of which is met when both factor markets are perfectly
competitive. The sign of the bias in the ratio of marginal productivity will be








2.2 CES production functions
Let technology be summarized by a CES production function, i.e. F(L1;L2) =
[￿L
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)L
￿
2]
1=￿ with ￿ 2 (￿1;1]. The parameter ￿ measures the e¢ -
ciency of factor 1 relative to factor 2 whereas the parameter ￿ determines ￿
the elasticity of substitution between factors, i.e. ￿ = 1
1￿￿. Given the CES




















It is clear that as long as the last term does not collapse, an estimate b ￿ of ￿ will
4The data may vary across observational units for various reasons. An interesting interpre-











2). The equilibrium data are then di⁄erent across observa-
tional units but the elasticities of supply remain similar. Putting ln￿t on the right hand side
of Equation 2 produces an "error" term that is generally added to the equation in empirical
applications.
4be biased (upward or downward). It is also clear that as soon as the elasticities
in the last term vary with Lt
j, and hence lnLt
j, an estimate b ￿ of ￿ will be biased
(again upward or downward). Two particularly interesting cases arise.









1 ￿ b ￿














. The estimate b ￿ of ￿ will su⁄er an upward
bias when "2
"1 < 1 and a downward bias otherwise. However, the estimate b ￿ will
be consistent in this case.
Case 2: supply elasticities are such that 1 + 1
"j(Lj) = ￿jL
￿













1 ￿ b ￿












and b ￿ = ￿￿￿. Case 1 is clearly a special case
met when ￿ = 0 and where ￿j = 1 + 1
"j. The bias in the estimate b ￿ of ￿ is
therefore similar to that discussed in Case 1. In contrast to Case 1 though, as
soon as ￿ 6= 0, an estimate b ￿ of ￿ will su⁄er a bias: downward bias when ￿ > 0
and upward when ￿ < 0.
Theorem 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 using the speci￿cation of Case 2. The
marginal costs and marginal productivity of factor 1 relative to factor 2 are










.6 On each panel, the equilibrium condition captured in
Equation 2 corresponds to the crossing point of the marginal cost curves with
the marginal productivity curve. In each panel we consider three supply curves
capturing shifts in relative supply over time or across countries. The observed

























￿ ! lnLj (see the Box-Cox
transformation). Let constj = wj ￿ 1
￿, ￿j = 1 and ￿ ! 0. We then have lnwj(Lj) ! wj
which corresponds to the perfect competition case.
6In these simulations, we used a CES production function and the parametric shape dis-
cussed in section to calibrate the supply curves.













. As stated in Theorem
1 these points are identical in both panels. Note that, in contrast to perfect
competition (the left panel), under monopsony (the right panel) these data do
not trace out a demand curve consistent with the true production function.
3 Monte Carlo Simulation
The simulation exercise considers an economy with CES technology F(L1;L2) =
[￿L
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)L
￿
2]










t=0. The data generat-








1 ￿ b ￿














and b ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿. The random term ut is
independently distributed and follows a Normal distribution7 N(0;0:22) whose
variance is scaled such that the R2 of our regressions is about 0.85. Factor
quantities Lt
j are independently and uniformly distributed over [5;15].
We consider four economies that share the same technology with elasticity
of substitution equal to 2, i.e. ￿ = 0:5, and equal e¢ ciencies for both factors.
￿ = 0:5. However, these four economies face di⁄erent factor market structures.
In particular:
￿ (Economy 1) ￿1 = 0:3, ￿2 = 0:1 and ￿ = 1
4,
￿ (Economy 2) ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:3, and ￿ = 1
4,
￿ (Economy 3) ￿1 = 1:5, ￿2 = 2, ￿ = 0 and,
￿ (Economy 4) ￿1 = ￿2 = 1 and, ￿ = 0.
Economy 1 corresponds to our benchmark economy with supply elasticities of
2.14 and 1.22 for factor 1 and 2 respectively. Economy 4 is the polar economy
that faces perfectly competitive factor markets. Two intermediate cases are
also examined. In economy 2, factor markets are imperfect but the elasticities
of supply are equal for both factors. In economy 3, the elasticities of supply are
constant though di⁄erent for the two factors. For each economy, we generate
1,000 samples of size N = 100. For each sample we estimate the parameters
b l = ln
b ￿
1￿b ￿ and b ￿ = 1
1￿b ￿ of Equation 6 using Ordinary Least Square technique.
The simulation results are reported in Table 1. As expected, the estimates of
both b l and b ￿ are biased in Economy 1. The relative e¢ ciency of factor 2 is





estimate of the elasticity of substitution is also biased, i.e. b ￿ = 1
1￿b ￿ = 4
3 ￿ 1:33.
7An interpretation of u is provided in footnote 4.
6It is striking to see that given our parametric setting, at feasible magnitudes of
supply elasticities8, one estimates the elasticity of substitution to be 1.33 (as
Katz and Murphy for instance) whereas the true elasticity is equal to 2.
Finally, as expected, estimates of the relative e¢ ciencies are biased in Econ-
omy 3 but unbiased in Economy 2 while estimates of the elasticity of substitution
are unbiased in Economy 3 but biased in Economy 2.
4 Conclusion
Recent work has established strong evidence that the labor elasticity of supply
to the ￿rm is ￿nite. Production function estimation based on a representative
￿rm model had typically assumed that the ￿rm faces perfectly competitive input
markets. Finite elasticities imply that the ￿rm faces pro￿t maximizing condi-
tions that di⁄er from the standard model. Here, we have explored the economic
consequences of this assumption being violated.
Our ￿rst ￿nding is that equilibrium data on input factors (wages and quan-
tities) and an incorrect assumption of perfectly elastic labor supply to the ￿rm
will be rationalized only with a production function that di⁄ers from the true
production function in the economy. This is demonstrated in a clear example
shown in Figure 1.
We then explore this ￿nding in the context of a CES production function.
Elasticities that vary with the wage will generate biased estimates of the elas-
ticity of substitution as well as the e¢ ciency parameters. Even constant but
unequal elasticities will bias estimates of the e¢ ciency parameters, though not
the elasticity of substitution. It should be noted that, in the context of a Nested-
CES, incorrectly estimating the e¢ cient parameters in the bottom level of the
nest may cause higher level elasticities of substitution to be inconsistently es-
timated. A Monte Carlo simulation shows that, under reasonable parameter
values, the bias in the elasticity of substitution between two groups, say high
and low skilled labor, may be signi￿cant. Speci￿cally, we show that a true
elasticity of 2 may be estimated as 1.4.
These ￿ndings provide a caveat for production function estimation. Ideally,
a structural model would use data that would also allow for estimation of the
labor elasticity of supply to the ￿rm in order to correctly specify the production
function estimation model.9 However, such ￿rm level data is hard to come by.
A potentially valuable method for applied researchers to follow is the control
function approached used by Lup-Tick and Oaxaca (2004) in their paper on
gender biased technological change, where they consider that male and female
wages may di⁄er for reasons other than di⁄erences in marginal productivity,
8This numbers are comparable with estimates from the studies listed in Footnote 1
9Dupuy and Marey (2008) estimate Equation 5 for skilled and unskilled labor in the US
between 1963 and 2005. They ￿nd that b ￿ = 1
1￿b ￿ shifts twice over time. Although Dupuy
and Marey (2008) argue in favor of technical change as an explanation thereof, Corollary 2
indicates that changes in the relative supply elasticities of skilled and unskilled labor could
have generated these shifts.
7such as taste based discrimination. In a more general context, their approach
of controlling for the unexplained wage gaps from a Oaxaca decomposition may
also help tackle the issues raised here, where di⁄erent labor elasticities of supply
to the ￿rm a⁄ect wages along with di⁄ering marginal productivity.
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